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Abstract 
Project performance is contingent upon the continuous ability of key decision-makers to collaborate effectively when solving 
emerging complex problems. In settings of large and complex projects, the ability to make sound decisions collectively across 
multiple tasks and phases increases in importance. 
 
Experimental studies have pointed to the existence of collective intelligence, i.e. the ability of groups to perform well across a 
variety of tasks. Nevertheless, we are not close to a process theory that clarifies why and how some groups are more ‘intelligent’ 
than are others, i.e. why and how they are better at solving a variety of complex problems. In order to answer these questions, we 
conduct an exploratory study of the drivers and manifestations of collective intelligence among a group of key decision makers in 
a large and dynamically complex project. The study reveals how these decision makers in general demonstrate a collective ability 
to solve a wide range of emerging problems in this project. This problem solving ability is characterized by very short and direct 
(face to face) lines of communication, the combination of divergent and convergent modes of thought, and small subgroups that 
are formed spontaneously dependent on the problem at hand and the expertise required to solve it. 
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1. Introduction 
Projects rely on the ability of their key decision makers to – often in concert – effectively assess and handle 
continuously uncertain and changing circumstances1. Chronological methodologies capable of representing the 
complicated structure and process of large and complex projects are generally a prerequisite for project planning and 
performance, but this approach alone is not fully capable of dealing with unforeseen challenges that emerge during a 
complex project life cycle. We cannot expect a given state of affairs to be stable over time, and we can expect an array 
of ‘unknown unknowns’2 to emerge and warrant a resolution. Many facets of the complexity facing a project are 
unknown both in advance and during the project, and they emerge as results of decisions and changing circumstances 
both inside and outside the project during the course of its lifecycle, e.g. from previous decisions, new technologies, 
force majeure, and change orders. In addition, projects are in and by themselves time-constrained, and they draw 
participants from different disciplines and functional units in order to produce one-time outputs3. Each person brings 
specific expertise and experience to the project team4 enabling them to solve complex problems. The successful 
outcome of projects may often be contingent upon the compiled problem-solving abilities of its key decision makers. 
 
Cooperation makes sense when the problem complexity warrants individuals to bring different parts of the answer to 
the table5,6. Emphasizing the synergy emerging from cooperation, Driskell and Salas7 link team performance to the 
rate with which individuals take part in collective, cooperative behaviors, including accepting and receiving input and 
suggestions from teammates. At high rates of collaboration, team members are likely to integrate each member’s 
efforts through even team collaboration, generating productive interactive effects among members8. Hence, 
individuals of a team in combination embody more cognitive resources than that of the individuals simply put together. 
 
Although scholars have recognised that individuals vary in their cognitive ability9, limited attention has been shown 
to the intelligence of groups, i.e. their ‘collective intelligence’10. We know many pieces of the puzzle about the 
processes of well performing groups – e.g. the mere distribution and integration of knowledge among members – but 
we are still not close to a complete process theory that explains why some groups are more ‘intelligent’ than are others, 
i.e. over time are better at solving a variety of dissimilar problems. Experimental research of collective intelligence 
has indicated that compositional features of a group, combined with interactional processes, may be a source of 
collective intelligence11, i.e. mutual cognitive capacities being successfully mobilized and coordinated in groups 
solving a diversity of problems. 
 
To further our understanding of how groups of decision makers managed to solve a variety of problems during the 
execution of a project, and to assess the properties of their collective intelligence on project performance, we 
conducted a longitudinal in-depth qualitative process study of key decision makers in the production of a large and 
technologically advanced offshore vessel. Our data broadly supports the link between collective intelligence and the 
performance of projects characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and dynamic complexity. In situations of short 
and direct lines of communication, the combination of divergent and convergent modes of thought, and where small 
subgroups were formed spontaneously dependent on the problem at hand and the expertise required solving it, swift 
problem solving increased. Exploring the mechanisms that bring about collective intelligence in a dynamic 
environment have implications for team and group work in general, and for project management in particular. 
2. Project complexity, decision making and collective intelligence 
Seen as a social task, projects involve the interpretation of events and development of shared understanding and 
conceptual schemes before arriving at a particular action12. Project teams are assembled as a result of the combination 
of individual team members who together perform better by using the sum of individual effort and skills13. In large 
and complex projects with dynamic effects on decision-making, the imperative to plan and execute projects 
successfully (optimising both speed and quality) put particular high demands on the decision-making and problem-
solving capacity of the key decision makers as they collectively need to integrate information, knowledge and opinions 
to arrive at decisions or solutions. Focusing on the project manager, Sengupta, Abdel-Hamid and van Wassenhove14 
found that even experienced project managers failed to learn and meet targets in time-limited and dynamically 
complex settings. Similarly, van Oorschot, Akkermans, Sengupta and van Wassenhove15 found that a new product 
development team of a leading semiconductor manufacturing company failed to notice the derailing of the project 
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until it was too late. Therefore, it might seem that experienced project members in some situations are insufficient per 
se for the efficient performance of a large and dynamically complex project. The interaction effects in projects 
demonstrate that a combined increase in uncertainty and scope amplifies overall project complexity16 adding to the 
required collective intelligence among the key decision makers. 
 
Once a project is exposed to a problem, the subsequent decision might, on the one hand, solve the problem and stabilize 
the project. On the other hand, the decision might also open up a series of emerging subproblems, thereby destabilizing 
the project. Extended time lags between actions and outcomes, or causes and effects, slow down the learning cycle, 
which reduces the ability to accumulate experience17. A decision-making process can therefore be seen as iterative, 
prone to multiple inputs, and difficult to both describe and comprehend in linear and rational terms. The process 
becomes dynamic and uncertain, and so do the demands for both individuals and groups in arriving at sound decisions. 
While groups and organizations may coordinate through the explicit creation of plans and routines, dynamic situations 
necessitate planning that happens in real time18. 
 
Collective intelligence has been found to correlate non-significantly with member intelligence (both highest and 
average) but significantly with the equality of participation and the ability to reason about the mental states of others†. 
While Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi and Malone19 measured this “social perceptiveness” by interpreting the 
mental states of others from looking at their eyes, Engel, Woolley, Jing, Chabris and Malone20 found the same strong 
correlation between social perceptiveness abilities and group performance in online environments with limited 
nonverbal cues, indicating a domain-independent aspect of social reasoning deeper than the recognition of facial 
expressions. Curseu, Jansen and Chappin21 found that collaborative decision rules have superior synergic effects over 
the average intelligence of groups although on average not outperforming their best member. One important 
implication of these findings is that participative decision-making22 can facilitate higher collective intelligence. 
Despite the fact that most research on team cognition, has focused on relations in explicit team processes, DeChurch 
and Mesmer-Magnus23 found that emergent (collective) cognition enables team members both to predict and anticipate 
each another’s actions and to fully make use of the often diverse collection of expertise present in the team. A number 
of conceptualisations of team cognition have included the importance of implicit coordination substituting or 
supporting explicit communicative processes6,24,25.  
3. Research gap 
Assessing how collective intelligence per se predicts group performance on different tasks has thus far mostly been 
conceptual5,11,26 and experimental19-21. DeChurch and Mesmer-Magnus23 in their meta-analysis of team cognition 
found that its effects on both behavioural process and team performance are stronger when its emergence is 
represented through compilation (synergetic) than composition (congruent or accurate isomorphic emergence) – and 
that in future work on team cognition, the formative multilevel process underpinning emergent cognition should be 
addressed. It might be that the manifestation of collective intelligence is more profound among real-life groups where 
members often know each other better and are better able to reason about each other, and where intelligent solutions 
are contingent on distributed professional knowledge. In addition, it would be advantageous for research on team 
cognition to further incorporate the role of time27, e.g. how groups in real-life settings under dynamically complex 
circumstances and partial uncertainty interactively arrive at sound decisions. Such temporal considerations include 
problem solving, dynamic cognition24, and adaptive team performance outcomes28. 
 
Yet, how collective intelligence emerges and exists over time in real-life projects or organisations operating in settings 
of dynamic complexity and delayed feedback remains unexplored. Curseu, Jansen and Chappin21 point towards 
investigating the development of strong cognitive synergy in groups, i.e. how the development of meta-cognitive 
processes in groups may play a key part in the emergence of concerted cognition and the development of collective 
intelligence. Considering project changes (and not collective intelligence per se), Zhang29 calls for in-depth studies of 
decision-making patterns in which stakeholders encounter changes and handle varying and contradictory interests and 
objectives. Burke and Morley30 similarly refer to a paper by Williams31 pointing to the fact that the inability to manage 
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complexity (back then) had been recognized as an important factor in project failure for a number of years. Collective 
intelligence as a construct is still in a state where its available theorizing lacks clarity and internal consistency in order 
to make specific predictions, and thus the construct cannot be tested in a rigorous way32. We still have some 
exploratory theory building to do. 
4. Methodology 
By tracing processes in their natural contexts33, we sought to identify the manifestation of collective intelligence 
among the central decision makers of a large and complex project, i.e. how the central decision makers performed 
with regards to problem solving across a wide range of activities and emerging issues during the course of the project. 
As a research strategy this meant focusing on understanding the dynamics present within a single setting while crafting 
theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from the empirical evidence34. Although being primarily 
inductive, this study began with ex ante focal and arranging concepts35 (dynamic complexity, judgement, team 
cognition, collective intelligence, decision-making, problem solving) as a selective focus for observing the change 
processes. Tracing problem-solving and collective intelligence in their context, necessitated attention to events, 
information cues, and decisions as actors enacted them during the problem-solving process. Decision making in such 
a setting is a multilevel process36, with smaller decisions typically nested within larger decisions, which may 
themselves be part of larger group projects37. Hence, the level of analysis was the process of collective problem solving 
among the key decision makers. 
 
Drawing on Langley38 and Sminia39, the raw data was recorded as incidents: basic descriptions about what happens, 
who does what, and at what level of analysis. Concepts were issues, information cues, (collective) judgements, ideas, 
decisions, context, and outcome with a special attention to the stimuli and processes that brought them about, and by 
their role in collectively solving a variety of problems. In order to identify a project in which a particularly high degree 
of dynamic complexity was present, the setting needed to have the characteristics of being technologically highly 
advanced, or exploratory; and the design cycles being preferable multiple, with design freeze well into the execution 
of the project life cycle.  
 
The setting became “the Yard”, one of several “Shipco” yards producing highly advanced offshore vessels. In a 
comparable work setting described by Emblemsvåg40 and Vaagen and Aas41, vessels often change substantially from 
contracting to delivery by frequent and unsystematic client input, as well as by frequent regulatory interventions, on 
the edge of known technology. At the same time, since short delivery times are critical, and almost every vessel is put 
into engineering and production before all technical uncertainty is resolved, it is common that the engineering of the 
vessel starts when only the footprint of a strategic component is known and large scale strategic adaptations, far into 
the production process, may also happen. The planning and decision making complexity is consequently arising from 
frequent design changes and advanced design and engineering taking place concurrently with production. Exploratory 
studies point to team interactions and tacit knowledge as important enablers of competitive advantage in this 
industry42. Other types of uncertainties and events external to the project, like harsh weather, further complicate 
problems. 
 
We followed the project during the course of a year, collecting more than a hundred hours of observation around the 
Yard, and doing 21 semi-structured interviews with key decision makers. The key decision makers were the project 
planner, four production coordinators, the technical coordinator, the project planner, the procurement coordinator, as 
well as various supervisors with responsibility for individual activities and work packages. Albeit presenting a partial 
view, observing meetings of the key decision makers was a central window to the collective decision processes and 
solution capabilities among the key decision-makers. We also included emails and other correspondence between 
project stakeholders as “observations”. 
5. Summary of preliminary research findings 
The project was both structurally and dynamically complex, i.e. the combined activities, work packages, individuals 
and components were almost interminable, and with their interrelations often impossible to fully take into account and 
plan for. In their planning, the key decision makers seemed attentive to this uncertainty. Ad-hoc problems emerged 
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daily and were handled at all levels from supervisor to project manager. The issues and ad hoc problems were by 
nature unanticipated, ranging from the discovery of colliding cables to the occurrence of the strongest storm in local 
history. The involvement of key decision makers took place at both formal and ad hoc meetings, in production, and 
through encounters such as ‘daily tours’ by the Project Manager, Production Coordinators and Production Manager. 
Sometimes they solved problems one-to-one. At larger meetings, and more focused meetings involving single issues 
and typically with a technical drawing as visual reference points, participants seamlessly put forward and assessed 
each other’s ideas and opinions. 
 
Although key decision makers formally planned the specific dates, people and hours to use in the project, they were 
not able to take into consideration all related events. This uncertainty normally necessitates a time buffer, although 
there was all but none in this project. Possible delays were at the most to be counted in days, but the deadline remained 
unaltered. When a problem arose, reaction time was short. Decision makers contacted relevant people or called in for 
meetings where they quickly assessed aspects to do with technology, production and procurement. Effective 
communication was not only one-way but also being able to listen to what was being said and reported, and how it 
was prioritised. One key decision maker expressed it in this way: “We delegate a lot of decision authority. […] There 
needs to be a dialogue, maybe involving several Departments discussing an issue – and involving an exchange of 
opinions with both ‘for’ and ‘against’ so that you obtain several views on a case before you make a decision.” 
 
From the view of the Production Coordinators, communication with the different supervisors was good, e.g. 
concerning ongoing problem solving and emerging issues. The Yard had no formal system to report issues, unless 
they were above a certain cost level. The open-door policy of the various Departments was in force with colleagues 
in need of answers or opinions visiting each other while they were in their offices or even in meetings. Although the 
issues of such encounters often were not resolved with absolute certainty, they did result in tentative decisions and 
decreased uncertainty. Trust was high among the project group, i.e. key decision makers employed by the Shipco 
Group. Among the decision makers employed at the Yard, the relations were particular close. Although not being the 
case for many projects, key decision makers in the studied project were usually from the same region and knew each 
other from previous projects, enhancing the degree to which they were able to conceive, understand, and communicate 
subtle details with relevance to decision making and problem solving. At informal meetings, the dialogue was fluid, 
participatory and based on relevant knowledge. At formal meetings, participants were encouraged to voice issues, e.g. 
through taking turn around the table. In general, different issues discussed were in a combined atmosphere of time 
pressure and good relations. Including a storm leading to a major adjustment in the project plan (known as “the project 
in the project”), the project group managed to handle crucial changes to planned activities. In planning the duration 
of some of the activities, the project group was a bit optimistic, although they considered this orientation towards 
action an enabler of project progress in a context of time pressure and uncertainty. 
 
While noting the above, there was a gap related to the work progress of the subcontractors between what participants 
discussed at the Production Meetings and what happened in the production. There seemed to be a lack of supervision 
from the side of the Yard regarding these outsourced tasks. In addition, the observed collective intelligence was higher 
within departments than between departments, and much higher than between the Yard and its subcontractors. 
6. Discussion 
Research on dynamically complex tasks demonstrates that even relatively minor flows of inventory when managing 
the production and distribution of a commodity bring about a great deal of complexity17. From a planning perspective, 
creating flexible project schedules to adapt to frequent design changes and other types of uncertainties means 
modelling very complex stochastic dynamic processes;  schedules that would be difficult to follow due to bounded 
rationality, even when we disregard the complexity of developing such plans (for more details on this, see Vaagen 
and Kaut43). As a result, team interactions and judgmental processes largely underpin industrial state-of-practice 
planning and decision-making42. In the case of the Yard, having little or no time buffer in a large and complex project, 
left the key decision makers vulnerable to most unforeseen events. In addition to working in a dynamically complex 
setting in and by itself, the key decisions makers worked in a high pace environment and under severe time constraints. 
Events and activities affected other activities in uncertain patterns of which decision makers were not aware a priori. 
A recurring characteristic was the emergence a variety of new issues in need of being solved because of new or 
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adjusted activity conditions. By fruitfully handling these issues over time, groups of decision makers regularly 
displayed a high degree of collective intelligence. 
 
Davies and Brady44 argue that firms often take on categories of projects that are similar and that they as a result involve 
repeatable and predictable patterns of activity. This, in turn, leads to economies of repetition and predictability among 
the key decision makers, shown both in behavioural patterns and in outcomes. All this seems to enhance the effective 
coordination and application of information cues and knowledge over a range of problems being different in nature. 
Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil and Gibson24 suggest longevity, knowledge diversity, trust, and group efficacy as four 
important factors enabling the formation of team cognition. In the case of the Yard, trust was a background prerequisite 
for the close cooperation between the key decision-makers at all levels. The process among the key decision makers 
of solving emerging problems at the Yard was by large organic45. This seemed to enhance the effect of both task and 
team mental model similarity on the problem solving ability of existing and emerging groups of key decision makers. 
6.1. Practical implications 
In order to facilitate swift problem solving, project managers need not only enhance congruence, accuracy, and 
complementarity of cognition among key decision makers – but also to consider frankness and even participation. 
Reacting intelligently on emerging events, and recognising that events and seemingly insignificant decisions in one 
phase of a project may have a major effect later in the project life cycle, may be vital concerning both performance 
and outcome of complex projects. The recommendation for managers that seek to increase collective intelligence 
among (ad hoc) groups of decision makers is to facilitate direct relations, social sensitivity and participatory judgement 
and decision-making. 
6.2. Limitations and future research 
Observing problem solving in groups is in itself complex. The appearance of judgements and decisions range from 
being easily noted to being tacit46. At the team level, however, the interpretative processes are easier to observe, as 
they do not occur only in the team members’ minds but are shared through communication47. 
 
The study is undertaken in a single organization, limiting the ability to validate findings with a case from a different 
organisation and thereby generalizing the results. At the same time, it is possible to find a repetitive pattern of events 
in the same organization, which allows the validation of findings in the same sample but at a different time35. 
 
The study does not include leadership style as such. Rosing, Frese, and Bausch (2011) found for instance, that 
transformational leadership correlates more strongly for the opening-up phase, whereas transactional leadership was 
generally more effective for the later phase of idea implementation. Since the key decision makers in this case are 
characterized by a high degree of problem solving autonomy, this omission is somewhat counteracted. 
 
Although based on the assumption that written and oral group communication reveal mental model content, in 
selecting coding, we influence the characterization of the observed intelligence of groups. At the same time, the 
informants articulate the cognitive content in their own terminology. Qualitative process research allows us to observe 
and describe emerging causal relationships, as well as permitting for independent and continuous data collection. 
 
As such, this study opens opportunities for further research into the conditions under which collective intelligence of 
project groups exists and may be enhanced. 
7. Conclusion 
Using a combined theoretical framework relevant to collective intelligence, we found that the general problem-solving 
ability of groups of decision makers may be characterized by very short and direct (face to face) lines of 
communication, the combination of divergent and convergent modes of thought, and small subgroups that are formed 
spontaneously dependent on the problem at hand and the expertise required to solve it. 
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